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Responding, in part, to disappointing results from attempts to change behavior via information, not only for diet but for other domains (c.f., James Choi, David Laibson, and Brigitte C. Madrian 2005) , behavioral economists have proposed a new approach that operates not via information, but by "nudging" (Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein 2008) individual behavior toward self-interest. Termed "asymmetric paternalism" (Colin Camerer et al. 2003) or "libertarian paternalism" (Thaler and Sunstein 2003) , this approach has two central 1 There is some evidence that information, provided in the right form, can lead to desirable changes in behavior. One study found that providing information about smokers' lung capacity in terms of "lung age" led to greater quit rates than providing the same information as a percent of lung capacity, as is standard (Gary Parkes et al. 2008) . The literature on disclosure of risks (Archon Fung, Mary Graham and David Weil 2007) documents numerous cases in which dissemination of information had beneficial effects on consumers and producers of risky products, although it also provides counterexamples.
tenets. First, as embodied by the libertarian term, it is intended to shift behavior in self-interested directions without abridging individuals' ultimate freedom to choose. Second, as embodied in the term "asymmetric," it is intended to help those behaving in a self-destructive fashion without distorting the decisions of those behaving in a self-interested fashion.
In recent papers, one of the authors of this paper (George Loewenstein) and his colleagues have been advocating a specific approach to asymmetric paternalism (Loewenstein, Troyen Brennan, and Kevin G. Volpp 2007; Loewenstein, Leslie John, and Volpp forthcoming) . The essence of the approach is to use decision errors that ordinarily hurt people to instead help them. For example, the status quo bias, the tendency to stick with the current or default option even when superior options are available (William Samuelson and Richard Zeckhauser 1988) , can be used to help people if healthy options are made the default. Setting the desired option as the default has been shown to increase retirement savings (Madrian and Dennis Shea 2001) and organ donation rates (Eric Johnson and Daniel Goldstein 2003) . Present-biased preferences (O'Donoghue and Rabin 1999), the tendency to place disproportionate weight on immediate outcomes, can likewise be used to "supercharge" incentives in programs that reward people for engaging in farsighted behavior, such as losing weight, by providing frequent, immediate rewards for good behavior (Volpp et al. 2008) .
In this paper, we summarize results from two field experiments examining the effects of providing dietary information and of an asymmetrically paternalistic intervention on consumers' selections of food items.
2 The first study (Jessica Wisdom, Julie Downs, and Loewenstein 2009a) compares the impact of providing calorie information to that of making more healthful options more convenient to order. The second study (Wisdom et al. 2009b) , which focuses only on information provision, examines whether calorie information reduces calorie intake and, if so, whether its impact depends on the way the information is provided. 2 The regression tables for all the statistics we report can be found in our online Appendix (available at http://TK). This study aimed to assess the effects of information versus an asymmetrically paternalistic intervention that made more healthful sandwiches slightly more convenient to order. Customers entering a fast-food sandwich shop were offered a free meal (a sandwich, side dish, and drink) in exchange for completing a survey. Those who agreed to participate chose their meal from a menu we provided, then completed the survey. To minimize demand effects, materials were designed to suggest that our interest was in the survey and that the meal choice was incidental.
The experiment, a 2x2x3 factorial design, varied (1) the provision (or not) of a calorie recommendation, which was presented in terms of daily targets for men and women with sedentary versus active lifestyles; (2) the provision (or not) of specific calorie information for all menu items; and (3) the relative convenience of healthful sandwich options (healthful more convenient, unhealthful more convenient, or neither). Subjects were given a binder that contained brief initial instructions, followed by a one-page "featured subs" menu. Depending on the experimental condition, this page contained either the five most caloric sandwich options, the five least caloric options, or a mix. At the bottom of the page, in large letters, subjects were informed that "Additional subs are available in the pamphlet at the back of this binder."
This convenience manipulation plays on two biases, discussed above, that ordinarily promote high calorie intake. Present-biased preferences typically encourage unhealthful choices because enjoyment of a meal is immediate whereas the consequent weight gain is delayed. We exploited present-biased preferences by introducing a tiny immediate cost to selecting a sandwich off the additional (nonfeatured) menu (opening the menu at the back of the binder). The status quo bias was similarly made to work in consumers' favor by making healthful options the implicit default.
The determinants of participants' choices of low-versus high-calorie sandwiches were examined using logistic regression, and the determinants of total meal calories (including drink and side dish) were examined with OLS. All regressions controlled for gender, age, and race, although the pattern of results is unchanged if these covariates are not included.
There was no main effect on picking a lowcalorie sandwich of providing either calorie information ( p = 0.18) or the daily calorie recommendation ( p = 0.92), nor was the interaction between these variables significant. In contrast, the convenience manipulation had a strong impact on sandwich choice, such that participants were more likely to choose low-calorie sandwiches when it was more convenient to do so (Figure 1) . Compared to the mixed featured menu and adjusted for all other predictors in the regression, those who received the healthful featured menu were 48 percent more likely to choose a low-calorie sandwich ( p < 0.001), whereas those who received the unhealthful menu were 47 percent less likely ( p < 0.001).
Adding dieting status (as reported by subjects in the survey) and interactions between dieting status and each of the treatments to the previous regression yielded two new significant effects: (1) Controlling for all other predictors in the model, dieters were on average 71 percent more likely to order a low-calorie sandwich ( p < 0.05). However, (2) when provided with calorie information, dieters were 76 percent less likely to order a low-calorie sandwich ( p < 0.01). The interaction is somewhat disturbing in its suggestion that providing calorie information increases calorie intake selectively for those attempting to lose weight.
For total meal calories (including drinks and side dishes) there was a marginally significant (B = −48.05, t (289) = −1.67, p = 0.10) beneficial effect of calorie information on calorie intake, but no significant effect of daily calorie recommendation ( p = 0.19), nor any interaction. The effect of receiving the healthful featured menu significantly decreased total meal calories relative to the mixed menu control condition (B = −76.65, t(289) = −2.25, p < 0.05). However, there was virtually no difference in total meal calories between those given the high-calorie versus the mixed-calorie featured sandwich menu ( p = 0.65), suggesting that those ordering higher-calorie sandwiches due to receiving the unhealthful menu ordered lowercalorie side dishes and/or drinks.
In sum, the asymmetrically paternalistic convenience manipulation had a substantial and statistically significant calorie-reducing effect across both dieters and nondieters. In contrast, providing calorie information had a limited effect on food choice, and there is some evidence of a perverse, calorie-increasing effect of providing this information to dieters. Calorie information did, however, reduce meal calories by about 50 calories, an effect smaller than this study was powered to test. If it proves reliable, this modest change could have clinical significance if instantiated daily to multiple meals.
II. The New York City Food Labeling Study
In 2006, the New York City Department of Health passed legislation mandating that, as of July 1, 2007, all food establishments with standardized portions post calorie information on their menu boards (Department of Health and Mental Hygiene 2006) . To test whether this information would affect food choices, we collected data at three locations (a coffee shop in Manhattan and two hamburger restaurant outlets of the same chain, one in Manhattan and the other in Brooklyn), both before and after implementation of the legislation. Researchers stood outside each restaurant during lunch hours. As customers approached, they were informed that they could get paid for turning in their receipt and completing a short survey when they exited. Among other items, the survey asked for additional information that we used to calculate the caloric content of their purchase (e.g., type of milk in a latte). Subjects received five dollars upon providing all requested information (for more detail, see Wisdom et al. 2009b ).
In addition to this "natural experiment" examining the impact of calorie posting, we implemented an experimental intervention in which randomly selected subjects were provided, before entering the restaurant, information either about suggested calorie intake per day or per meal (by dividing the daily recommendations by three). Although calorie intake guidelines, when available, are usually provided at the daily level, we hypothesized that per-meal recommendations would be easier to compare to actual meal choices, and might have a larger impact on behavior.
Using OLS, and running separate analyses for the coffee shop and for each location of the burger restaurant chain, we examined the impact on calories purchased of the legislation (i.e., the posting of calorie information) and the calorie recommendation variables, as well as day of week, age, sex and race.
At the coffee shop, there was no impact of the legislation (B = 11.50, t(320) = 0.26, p = 0.79) or of either calorie recommendation. The only significant effect was that African Americans consumed more calories than other groups (B = 81.62, t(320) = 2.04, p < 0.05). For the Manhattan hamburger restaurant, there was again no significant effect of the legislation (B = 19.49, t(568) = 0.34, p = 0.73) and a significant effect of race (B = 113.10, t(568) = 2.68, p < 0.01). At the hamburger restaurant in Brooklyn, however, fewer calories were consumed after the legislation went into effect (B = −76.61, t(466) = −1.96, p = 0.05), and calorie consumption was negatively related to age but not related to race. Furthermore, at the Brooklyn location, in contrast to the sandwich study, there was a marginal interaction between dieting status and legislation (B = −156.23, t(414) = −1.78, p = 0.08) such that dieters tended to be helped more than nondieters by the information. Finally, the calories-per-meal recommendation interacted marginally with dieting at both burger restaurants (Brooklyn: B = 210.13, t(414) = 1.82, p = 0.07; Manhattan: B = 196.63, t(414) = 1.81, p = 0.07), such that this recommendation significantly increased the caloric intake of dieters relative to nondieters. that provision of calorie information can have an impact on calorie intake, at least for some populations. Providing calorie targets at either the daily or meal level does not seem to have a beneficial effect, and may even have a perverse effect, on calorie intake.
III. Conclusions
In combination, these studies suggest that providing calorie information may have small effects on food choices, but may also produce perverse effects, such as promoting higher calorie consumption among dieters. Although we don't know why provision of calorie information sometimes had a negative impact on subsets of consumers, one possible reason is related to the previous example of cigarette smoking. People who want to achieve a goal, such as quitting smoking or losing weight, may seek to motivate themselves by exaggerating the threat they face. Thus, dieters may attempt to motivate themselves to choose low-calorie options by inflating their calorie estimates. Providing accurate information may, therefore, lead to a downward revision of calorie estimates, resulting in an increase in calorie intake, as observed in the sandwich study.
In contrast, the asymmetrically paternalistic manipulation of convenience had an effect on sandwich choice (the only decision for which it was implemented) that was sufficiently large to result in fewer total meal calories. Note, however, that these studies examined only the impact of the manipulations on a single meal. It is possible that those eating fewer calories, either due to the convenience manipulation or informational intervention, compensated later in the day by snacking more or eating more for dinner. A better test of the impact of such manipulations would measure aggregate food choices over time, as could be done using a longitudinal design. 
